ARTICLE

Legitimising Europe with the Social Sciences and Humanities? The European University Institute and the European Integration Project (1976–1986)

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Abstract

This article analyses the conditions under which political attempts at influencing the activities of scientists succeed or fail. It does so by assessing the impact of European politics on the development of the social sciences and humanities. More specifically, it focuses on the creation of the European University Institute (EUI) and studies the extent to which European institutions succeeded in orientating EUI scholars' scientific agenda, in a direction favourable to European integration. The article argues that this attempt only enjoyed limited success. It shows that the increasing autonomy of the disciplines under study meant that political injunctions had trouble gaining currency. The politicisation of sciences thus appears to be hampered by the changing structure of disciplinary fields.

Keywords

History of the Social Sciences and Humanities; Politicisation; Refraction; European Integration; European University Institute.

Introduction

European integration is deeply interwoven with knowledge production. As early as the 1940s, advocates of European integration identified science and culture as key instruments for the advancement of the European project. A university institute, the Bruges College of Europe, was created in 1949 to train future European elites (Schnabel 1998). The Euratom Treaty, which founded the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957, was signed to set up scientific, technological and political cooperation around nuclear energy, with a view of deepening European integration (Krige
European museums such as Jean Monnet’s House were created to promote Europe in the eyes of its citizens (Mazé 2009; Cadot 2010; 2014). Research centres like the Institut de la Communauté Européenne pour les Etudes Universitaires in Lausanne were given the task to develop a research agenda specific to European integration (Petit 2006; Calligaro 2013). European research Framework Programmes and other funding schemes were launched to sponsor scientific initiatives of particular interest to the European institutions (Koenig and Schoegler in this issue).

While the existence of connections between European politics and the history of sciences in Europe has been pointed out, few studies have assessed the implications of these connections for the development of disciplines: how did European research policies further or impede the institutionalisation of disciplines? Did they promote the development of particular paradigms, methods, ideas? Did they take scientific agendas closer to political ones—and, in particular, closer to topics and approaches directly connected to the European integration project?

This article seeks to answer these questions by looking at the case of the European University Institute (EUI). The EUI was legally created in 1972 and opened its doors four years later at the Badia Fiesolana, on the outskirts of Florence, Italy. Its first president was the Dutch politician Max Kohnstamm, former Secretary to the High Authority of the European Community for Coal and Steel. In the academic landscape of the time, the EUI was an atypical institution. In contrast to most of the other universities, it was research-oriented and only trained PhD candidates. Setting aside the dominant natural sciences, it focused on the social sciences and humanities (SSH) and established four departments: history and civilisation (HEC), economics (ECO), law (LAW), and the political and social sciences (SPS). While most other universities were part of a national system of higher education, the EUI had a transnational character: created by an international convention between European Community member countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands), it gathered professors and PhD candidates from all European member countries. As an institute founded as part of the European integration process and hosting disciplines which are, by nature, closer to political topics, the EUI is a stimulating case for observing the effects of European politics on sciences.

In recent years, European studies scholars have taken a growing interest in the sociology of ideas. Constructivist studies paved the way by emphasising the role of norms in the social construction of European institutions (Checkel 1998; Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener 1999; Rosamond 2003). Critical and reflectivist sociologists of European integration built on this idea and argued that knowledge producers (scientists, experts, consultants, lawyers, economists, etc.) played a key part in shaping the EU, understood as a “political, legal, economic, social, cultural and philosophical phenomenon” (Vauchez 2008; Favell and Guiraudon 2009; Mudge and Vauchez 2012; quote in Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2015: 157). They suggested that the social sciences of European integration had “theory effects” on the latter (Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2015) and should, therefore, be studied in their own right (Rosamond 2000; 2015).

While this literature claims affiliation with the “new sociology of ideas” (Camic and Gross 2001)—as in Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2015—it tends to only take up parts of this approach’s agenda. It does explore the interactions between European politics and the social sciences, but its main interest is in assessing the impact of these interactions on European integration. By contrast, their impact on scientific development has received less attention. This article seeks to contribute to filling this gap. In line with previous studies in the history and sociology of science (L’Estoile 2007; Mespoulet 2007; Fourcade 2009; Steinmetz 2013), it looks at how political actors (in this case, in particular, European
institutions) and contexts (European integration) influenced the development of the social and human sciences. Rather than arguing, as has been done for example in the case of the Cold War, that political contexts have an almost mechanical impact on the type of knowledge that scientists produce (Oren 2003; Erickson et al. 2013), this article analyses the conditions under which political attempts at influencing the activities of scientists succeed or fail (Solovey and Cravens 2012). In line with the Bourdieusian sociology of science, it argues that scientists may accept or resist attempts at “politicising” their activity, and that the extent to which they do so depends on the particular structure of their disciplinary field and their own position within it (Bourdieu 2001; Lagroye 2003). The article elaborates on the idea that the structures of scientific fields serve as mediating contexts which, like prisms, refract external influences and adapt them to the specific logics of disciplines (Bourdieu 1993; Maton 2005).

This argument rests on the comparative analysis of the early years of the HEC and SPS departments of the EUI. It focuses on the setting up of the social, institutional and intellectual structures of these departments, and on the way in which they coped with injunctions for political relevance. While the study is predominantly internal, it is situated in the broader context of disciplinary fields.

The study uses qualitative material drawn from archives and interviews. We consulted the archives of the EUI itself and personal funds (Table 1). We also conducted interviews with former professors and officials of the EUI, officials of the Directorate General for Information (DG X) of the European Commission, and members of the Liaison Committee of Historians (Table 2). The argument also rests on secondary sources on the creation and history of the EUI (Palayret 1996).

The article first presents the political impulse behind the EUI’s foundation and the setting up of the HEC and SPS departments. It then analyses the scientific controversies which soon emerged between the appointed professors. A final part shows how these internal struggles undermined the Europeanist research agenda originally envisaged for these two departments.

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1 As an institution created by a multilateral treaty, the EUI was also subject to the influence of European national governments, who had delegates on the Institute’s High Council. The minutes of the High Council’s meetings show, however, that the scientific orientation of the EUI was not a contentious issue, as national delegates largely limited themselves to confirming the views of the Academic Council—a body comprising the EUI’s president and academic staff. High Council debates were more heated when they dealt with funding, e.g. when the number of recruitments for managing the EUI library had to be decided (“Compte rendu de la 2ème réunion du conseil supérieur tenue à Florence, les 21 et 22 novembre 1975”, Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Folder 102, 13 January 1976, IUE 2/76). While these questions are important, they are of secondary interest to this article. There is no doubt that the EUI was the subject of debates at the national level, e.g. within higher education ministries, but given there scattered character these debates could not be traced in the framework of this research.

2 The article is based on the merging of two studies, respectively focused on the history of European integration and on the history of political science. This accounts for the focus on the HEC and SPS departments which could not, unfortunately, be completed by studies of their LAW and ECO counterparts.

3 Part of the research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 319974 (Interco-SSH).

4 Some of this material has only recently been made available to the public, due to a thirty-year embargo on the consultation of EUI documents, and to the fact that Hans Daalder only donated his own records to the University of Leiden in 2014.
Table 1: Archives

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archives</th>
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<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC), Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Florence</td>
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<tr>
<td>European University Institute</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Florence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hans Daalder</td>
<td>Former SPS professor (1976–1979)</td>
<td>University of Leiden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michel Dumoulin</td>
<td>Member of the Liaison Committee of Historians</td>
<td>Private</td>
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<td>by the European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacqueline Lastenouse</td>
<td>Former European Commission official</td>
<td>Private</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter Lipgens</td>
<td>Former HEC professor (1976–1979)</td>
<td>HAEU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emile Noël</td>
<td>Former European Commission official;</td>
<td>HAEU</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former President of the EUI (1987–1993)</td>
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Table 2: Interviews

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<th>Function</th>
<th>Place and date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stefano Bartolini</td>
<td>SPS PhD candidate (1976–1979), assistant</td>
<td>Florence, 27 June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>professor (1979–1985), and professor (1994–...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacqueline Lastenouse</td>
<td>Former European Commission official</td>
<td>Brussels, 3 September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name kept anonymous</td>
<td>Administrator of the EUI academic service</td>
<td>Florence, 15 March 2013</td>
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1. A University Institute for Legitimising Europe

The EUI was, from the outset, an institution built in line with a Europeanist agenda, i.e. with the explicit objective to promote European integration. Since its creation in 1952, the Press and Information Service of the European Commission (EC), forerunner of the Directorate General for Information (DG X) created in 1967, had indeed identified the university milieu as one of its priority targets (“milieux prioritaires”) (Reinfeld 2007). It recognised the part played by universities in the nation-building process, and suggested that they could play a “similar role in the formation of the European unity” (Reinfeld 2007: 67): they could highlight “the dynamism and the irreversibility of the integration process”5 and “lend the phenomenon [European integration] a sort of legitimacy of a great significance by making it the object of research, teaching and examination”.6

The foundation of the EUI rested on this rationale: the new institute was to contribute to “the development of a European consciousness that is essential if we are to reach our final objective [...].

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which is the political integration of Europe”. The ambition to provide access to this “European frame of mind and dimension” was also what justified that the Institute be centred on the SSH rather than the natural sciences: the former were seen as “presenting a particular interest for European unification” as they could, more than the latter, produce narratives that would further legitimise European integration (Loth 2012). In light of this objective and disciplinary focus, it also made sense for the EUI to have a proper transnational character: while physics and other natural sciences were seen as transnational by nature, SSH were described as marked by national traditions, “with the result that history does not come out the same whatever you do in France, in Germany, in Belgium, in Britain or in America”. Transnational collaboration between scholars of different nationalities was therefore seen as essential for achieving the Institute’s objectives.

The implementation of these principles and the setting up of the EUI were entrusted to a preparatory committee made up of two representatives of each state coming either from higher education (university rectors or professors) or higher education administration (members of ministries). It first produced a document outlining the “academic profile” of the new Institute and emphasised the need for it to focus on “largely international phenomena” rather than “national phenomena, for the treatment of which member states’ existing universities would be better equipped”. More specifically, it defined “democracy” as a priority field of investigation for all departments. It also identified department-specific agendas which, in the case of SPS, focused on “the problems of regionalism” (e.g. “the relationship between central and peripheral powers”, “the development of least favoured regions”, and “internal and international migrations”) and, in the case of HEC, on the “European historical consciousness” (e.g. “the history of the European idea”, “the notion of state”, “the evolution of cultural exchanges in Europe”, etc.). These research agendas are further indications of the close connection between the Institute and the challenges facing European integration.

The existence of a desire to give a political and pro-European dimension to the development of the SSH at the EUI is obvious. However, whether these aspirations would bear fruit depended heavily on the personnel that would be chosen to implement them. The task of hiring a first group of professors, also handled by the preparatory committee, was therefore key to the process. While these scholars would only be at the Institute on a temporary basis, the fact that they could set up the structures of the new EUI from an (almost) blank state meant their actions could have huge bearings on the future of the Institute.

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7 Gaetano Martino, then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Palayret 2001: 9.
8 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Palayret 1996: 121.
9 Etienne Hirsch, then President of the European Atomic Energy Commission and Chairman of the Interim Committee mandated to plan for the future European University, quoted in 1962 in Bulletin from the European Communities 85: 6.
11 Public policy studies have long shown that the implementation of initial principles cannot be taken for granted. The social structure and practices of the groups of actors tasked with implementing them, as well as the power relations between these actors, all play key part on the impact (or lack thereof) of these principles (Mégie 2010).
12 As the EUI was meant to rely only on temporary staff, professorial appointments were to be made for three years. While this length was later extended (standard appointments are now for five years, with possible extensions), the principle of having no permanent professors was retained.
13 On the impact of initial choices on the later development of institutions, see the literature on path dependence mechanisms, e.g. Palier 2010.
The appointment of these professors took place in two steps: applications were first centralised by member states, who were in charge of finding relevant candidates; and the preparatory committee then selected the eight new professors, who were formally appointed in 1975. While gaps in the archives make it difficult to know exactly who applied and what criteria were taken into account in the selection process, two principles seem to have presided over the committee’s choices: the group was to be balanced at the disciplinary level (two professors per department) and at the geographical level (balance between member countries); and different schools of thought were to be represented in order for the Institute not to “commit to a single way”. Formal correspondence between the members of the preparatory committee hints at additional, informal criteria: fluency in multiple languages (Italian, French, English), international connections and reputation, and broad social science and “non-professional culture”.

The three newly appointed SPS professors had different trajectories and positions in the field of political science. Jacques Georgel (France, 42 years old) specialised in the study of political institutions and regimes in France and Spain. He held the agrégation in law (1962) and was a professor at the University of Rennes (1962–1976). While he published his work in French, some of it was subsequently translated into Spanish and Italian. Hans Daalder (Netherlands, 47 years old) was a specialist of the comparative analysis of political parties and systems. A professor at Leiden University, he had also had frequent fellowships in the United States in the 1960s. He also was a founding member of the new European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR, see below) (Daalder 1997). Maurice Cranston (UK, 55 years old) was a political theorist and the author of intellectual biographies and conceptual analyses. A professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and the President of the International Institute of Political Philosophy, he had also held fellowships abroad, mostly in the US, in the 1960s and 1970s but also in France in 1977.

The differences between these scholars were emblematic of the broader structure of political science at the time. There was then no widespread agreement on what political science was, and what

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16 While Maurice Cranston was not, strictly speaking, part of the initial group of two professors, he was appointed soon after, in 1977.
19 “CV de Jacques Georgel”, in “Choix des huit premiers professeurs”, HAEU, Folder EUI-14, 12 March 1975, no. 366/75 (EN 44).
paradigms and methods it should use. Political studies had emerged in different ways in different countries, under the institutional umbrella and intellectual influence of more established disciplines. In France, as exemplified by the case of Georgel, they were intertwined with constitutional law. In the United Kingdom, as embodied by Cranston, they were closely connected to history, the history of ideas, and normative philosophy. The situation was, however, different in the US. While political studies had originally developed along the same historical and normative lines as in the UK, they had undergone, in the 1950s and 1960s, what has been retrospectively labelled as a “revolution” (Dahl 1961) with the rise to prominence of behaviouralism. The promoters of this paradigm veered away from the history and ideas to focus on the behaviour of political actors. They also contended that political studies should be more autonomous from neighbouring disciplines, and develop their own methods and theories. This claim was accompanied by an aspiration for the discipline to have more “scientific” standards, based on sophisticated, chiefly statistical, methods, and on a deductive, theory-driven approach. Originally marginal, behaviouralism gradually gained weight in the US (Hauptmann 2012) and spread internationally through various conferences and networks. It notably became represented in Europe through the ECPR, a consortium of academic institutions created in 1970 with the objective of helping the diffusion of behaviouralism and statistical methods on the old continent (Boncourt 2015). The three SPS professors thus approached political phenomena in fundamentally different—and, to a certain extent, rival—ways: Georgel, with his background in law, wrote about politics from a distinctively institutional and constitutional perspective; Daalder, a founding member of the ECPR, followed a more behaviouralist approach that focused on actors, such as political parties; and Cranston approached the subject from the normative study of great authors and concepts.

By contrast, the professors recruited at the HEC department did not represent significantly divergent historiographical traditions. The vague term of “civilisation” intended to cover research on “European idea” or “European historical consciousness”. Although names of philosophers, anthropologists, historians of ideas but also of specialists of medieval Europe appeared in the discussions of the preparatory committee, two professors of late modern and contemporary European history were eventually selected, thus excluding other geographical and temporal focus: Charles Wilson, 42, a business historian from Cambridge University who had held fellowships abroad (Harvard, Delaware, Tokyo); and Karl Dietrich Bracher, 53, a renowned specialist of the Third Reich from Bonn University, with a similar international profile (with fellowships at Stanford, Princeton, Oxford, and Harvard). Bracher, who had a mixed profile of historian and political theorist, was chosen for the Chair of Contemporary European History. At the time of his appointment, he was working on a history of Europe in the 20th century. The department also recruited an assistant professor, specialist of contemporary international history, Peter Ludlow, from the University of London. Educated in Oxford, Cambridge and Göttingen, Ludlow had published on German religious history and on Europe in the interwar and World War II period. These first appointments indicate the preparatory committee’s intention to focus the activity of the HEC department on contemporary Europe. A specific project, designed in parallel to the staff selection

25 EUI, Réunion Comité préparatoire Histoire et Civilisation, 1 October 1974; EUI, Décision du conseil supérieur portant création de huit postes permanents de professeurs attachés à l’Institut, HAEU, Folder EUI-14, 12 March 1975, no. 366/75 (EN 44).
process, reflects a further objective: to develop research specifically on the history of European unification.

At the initiative of the European Commission, its Secretary-General and the EUI’s President Kohnstamm signed in 1975 a contract regarding a “Projet d’histoire de la Communauté européenne” funded by the Commission and to be conducted at the HEC department, which was to open in September 1976. The project was to set up an international consortium of historians in charge of writing the history of the European Communities. As such, it was in keeping with the idea of creating synergies between scholars of several European countries and producing knowledge on European unification. The EUI board asked Pascal Fontaine to produce a note concerning the realisation of this project. A professor at Sciences Po Paris, Fontaine had been Monnet’s personal secretary since 1971 and stemmed from a “European family” who actively participated in the design of a “récit des origines de la construction européenne” (Cohen 2007: 20). His involvement indicates that this historiographical project was part of a larger design aiming at the production and promotion of a European “grand récit”.

The profile of the professor eventually chosen to conduct the project was in keeping with this political objective. When K. D. Bracher found himself in the impossibility of taking up the Chair of Contemporary European History, the position was offered to Walter Lipgens, a convinced European federalist. Critical towards the deleterious effects of nationalism in Germany and in Europe, he was an advocate of European unification, which became the central theme of his research from the mid-1960s onwards. He dedicated a monograph to the projects of European federation forged by the European Resistance movements during World War II. When he was appointed at the EUI, he was working on the book, Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik, published in German in 1977 and translated in English in 1982, which was to become a major reference for the emerging discipline of European integration history. The book located the birth of the European unity movement in the spirit of the Resistance against Nazism. With this focus on ideas and non-governmental actors, Lipgens broke with a general trend among historians who analysed European unification with the methods of diplomatic history and who hence put the emphasis on the actions of governments and diplomats. Pivotal to Lipgens’s analysis was the crisis of the European nation states, too weak to remain in control of their destiny, making unity the only way to preserve Europe and its culture.

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The choice of Lipgens and the project of European integration history gave the HEC department a clearly Europeanist research agenda, which soon provoked controversies. Likewise, the competition between different intellectual traditions that took place within the SPS department raised the question of the researchers’ position with regard to European integration.

2. Politicisation and Scientific Controversies

The newly founded EUI was a blank academic slate: in contrast to national universities, it was the first of its kind and did not have to comply with the complex set of norms, rules, and laws that shaped national academia. The initial staff was in charge of setting up everything from scratch, i.e. inventing rules, hiring PhD researchers, ordering books for the library, presiding over the refurbishment and equipment of the rooms to meet the needs of personnel and activities, etc.\(^{33}\)

This extensive room of manoeuvre and the lack of constraints from existing structures could have meant that the initial political agenda of the EUI would quickly take hold. The history of the departments under study suggests, on the contrary, that this attempt to link scientific activities to a political project faced strong resistances. These resistances were not a simple case of scientists disagreeing over the extent to which sciences should serve a political agenda. While this question was part of the equation, it was only one aspect of broader paradigm competitions. In other words, the existing intellectual structures of disciplinary fields had strong bearings on the extent to which scientific activities at the EUI could be politicised.

Faced with the task of leading the scientific life of the department (e.g. by organising doctoral seminars, launching and coordinating research projects, inviting visiting scholars, etc.), professors in the SPS department took different courses of action. In line with the efforts of ECPR, Daalder saw the EUI as a place where he could promote a behaviouralist blend of political science, with an emphasis on methodology, comparison, and empirical data. This choice was tangible in the list of professors that he invited to the department during its first year of activity: SPS hosted specialists of the study of party systems, pressure groups, the “overload of government”, and computer-assisted statistical analyses. Most of them had had professional experiences in the US, and many were members of ECPR’s executive committee (such as Stein Rokkan, Richard Rose, Dusan Sidjanski, and Rudolf Wildenmann). The connection to ECPR was quickly made explicit: the department became one of its member institutions in 1976, and the Consortium sponsored the organisation of an EUI summer school devoted to “comparative European politics” in 1977.\(^{34}\)

Jacques Georgel’s activities were of a different intellectual orientation. He held a seminar on political institutions in the nine European Community states, in the framework of which he invited colleagues who gave talks on the French political system, and on European integration: Jean-Pierre Cot (University Paris 1) focused on “Competence ideology and political propaganda under the Fifth Republic”, Jean Rivero (University Paris 2) lectured on the methods for protecting freedom in liberal Europe, and Pierre Mendès-France gave a course on “historical events in relation to European integration—the notion of democracy”. Thus, in contrast to Daalder’s, Georgel’s agenda was more directly in line with the EUI’s proposed focus on European integration, and the scholars whom he

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33 Hans Daalder, “Those first years at the Badia”, undated, communicated personally by the author.
invited had very different profiles from Daalder’s hosts: two of them were specialists of public law (Rivero, Cot), and one was a policy-maker (Mendès-France).35

The second year saw the setting up of Maurice Cranston’s seminar on the “concept of State”. Centred on political philosophy, it also drew upon “the historical perspective, together with contributions from legal theory, the subject being one which naturally invites an ‘interdisciplinary’ approach”.36 The list of invited scholars reflected this interdisciplinary emphasis, as it included political science, sociology, law, and philosophy scholars.

These parallel developments did not come without tensions. While disagreements were initially latent, they became more formalised on the occasion of a debate about “the future of political sciences at the EUI” in 1979. In an attempt to clarify the department’s “intellectual profile” and go beyond parallel individual initiatives, the members of the department sought to agree on a strategy for future appointments and activities.

An important correspondence was produced about these questions by members of the department Daalder, Georgel, Cranston, Giuseppe Di Palma (a specialist of “empirical political science” meant to temporarily replace Daalder, whose professorship would come to an end the following year), Rudolf Wildenmann (a specialist of the quantitative study of politics and political parties, who would take over from Di Palma after one year on a normal three-year professorial contract), Athanasios Moulikis (a professor of political philosophy who would start his professorship in 1979 and eventually take over Cranston’s role at the end of the latter’s contract), Stefano Bartolini, and Peter Mair (former Daalder’s PhD students, who had then become assistants to the department37).

Daalder, Mair, Bartolini, and Di Palma argued for the structuration of the department around a deductive, empirical, comparative, and to a certain extent quantitative political science oriented towards the realisation of collective projects. Cranston, Georgel, and Moulikis stressed the importance of the study of ideas and institutions, and presented political science research as a more personal endeavour. They criticised what they saw as “American-style political science” (“political science à l’américaine”) and contended that it should, in their view, make room primarily for the history of ideas, and for a “European-style political science” (“science politique à l’européenne”).

Researchers are spread into five seminars that correspond to four orientations: European-style political science, American-style political science, political ideas, sociology. [...] With 20 researchers obliged to follow seminars, we cannot in four directions in a profitable way; additionally, very few of them know how to use a computer. We therefore need to concentrate our efforts. In what areas?

a) Where our lack of competence will be the least damaging, which will allow the Institute to develop its influence and build a reputation which, for now, does not exist.

b) Also where we will be the most able to meet the expectations set by the Convention, i.e. to deepen European culture. [...]
It does not take a great expert to realise that it is easier, less expensive, and more adequate to the goals set by the Convention to direct research towards the history of ideas, also called political philosophy. This is, in my view, a priority.

The second orientation of the department should be chosen between three possibilities: international relations (neglected until now), European-style political science, sociology.\(^38\)

As hinted in this quote by Georgel, this paradigm opposition had implications for the way in which members of the department saw the EUI’s role with respect to European integration. While Daalder and others, in line with the behaviouralist idea that political science should be autonomous from neighbouring disciplines and from politics itself, argued that the Institute should be concerned with science only, other members of the department saw it at their duty to produce knowledge that would be useful for European integration:

> From the beginning there was substantial disagreement between those who saw ‘true’ academic research (generally consisting of theoretical and comparative study) as the paramount task of the Institute, and whose who thought of the EUI as a brains trust for the Community, a European Brookings.\(^39\)

The two camps also pushed for different appointments. Georgel and Cranston supported the appointment of Vincent Wright, a professor at the Oxford Nuffield College who specialised in French political history, and was the founding co-editor of the new journal *West European Politics*. Daalder and others supported the appointment of Peter Flora, then professor in Cologne and whose work, labelled “macrosociology”, sought to operate a wide-scale comparison of European welfare states, on the basis of collective research. This ambition resonated with EUI research on European parties in that it put the emphasis on the multivariate comparison of European societies.\(^40\)

These appointments gradually led to the end of the debate. Flora, together with Di Palma, Mair, Bartolini, and, later on, Wildenmann, strengthened the emphasis of the department on a comparative, deductive, and collective conception of European social science research. Political philosophy and the history of ideas remained represented, notably through Moulakis’s presence, but the more juridical and institutional approach that Georgel embodied declined after his departure as his successor, Vincent Wright, moved closer to the type of work undertaken by Bartolini and others (Wright 1997: 170). The Europeanist agenda, as one of the aspects of the debate, was thus eclipsed by a broader paradigm struggle and the rise to prominence of scholars who pursued other objectives.

In the HEC department, the adoption of a Europeanist agenda also gave rise to debates. In the discussions about the project “History of European integration”, divergences emerged over Fontaine’s and Lipgens’s openly federalist approach. Ludlow warned against the risk of a too federalist stance and about the teleological dimension that this historiography of European integration could take:

> We say that we want to write a history of the European Community? But what is the latter? [original emphasis] Western Europe is a Community in process of formation, without a single


\(^{39}\) Hans Daalder, “Those first years at the Badia”, *op. cit.*

centre and without a clearly defined future. There may one day be a single political entity, but there are at the present, as they have been in the past, many different forms of association and cooperation, and as historians of European integration we must allow for the variegated and partial character of what we are trying to describe. We have to base our work on a concept of Europe which is neither a collection of nation states, nor, still less, a new nation: a conceptual framework which allows free rein to the many different elements, official and unofficial governments and multinational companies, market forces and cultural and ideological enthusiasms, pro-Europeans and ‘antis’, which have moulded the politics of our community.41

Lipgens’s view contrasted with Ludlow’s:

Because of the process of European integration which strongly differentiates Europe after different ways: as the continued development of the history of the nations and as the common history of integration with common institutions, common patrimony of archives, etc. The scientific historiography of the national histories goes further in our countries. The History Department of the European University Institute considers as its duty the promotion of the multinational cooperation indispensable to the study of the common history of Europe. For the European Community, it is also important to acquire a proper and historical consciousness resting on scientific bases.42

Lipgens described the project in terms of a tangible political commitment: the European Community needed a scientific knowledge of its history, and the EUI would produce it. Lipgens’s objective was to write “a common history of Europe”, and the transnational nature of the object of study made it necessary to change research methods, not only through the “multinational cooperation” of historians of various national backgrounds, but also through the study of the “common patrimony of archives”. The goal was set on stimulating historical research on the integration process, especially by identifying and making accessible important sources like archives and official documents. The project was formally launched in September 1977 during an international symposium at the EUI.

The project contributed substantially to institutionalising European integration as a field of research. Although only one of the originally planned books on the archives of European integration was published,43 and only one of the four monographs proposed was produced, the latter was of importance. This was Lipgens’s History of European Integration. The Formation of the European Unity Movement44—the English version of his 1977 monograph in German. Its translation in the framework of the EUI project allowed the book to find a much wider audience, and it quickly became a work of reference for European integration history. The project also laid the foundations for the development of a transnational cooperation among scholars interested in European integration—which was one of the Commission’s goals. The scholars involved across Europe in the project continued to collaborate and their common work contributed to the emergence of history of European integration as a discipline.

41 Letter from Peter Ludlow to Pascal Fontaine, 6 March 1976, HAEU, Folder EUI-10, 1974–1981.
However, another objective—that of turning the HEC department into a permanent and attractive research centre on European integration history—was not achieved. This failure is mainly due to the complex relations that bound the project “History of European Integration”, Walter Lipgens, the EUI and the European Commission. In September 1979, Lipgens’s contract at the EUI ended. He did not ask for a renewal and returned to the University of Saarbrücken. Lipgens was indeed an already well-established professor in Germany and a longer stay at the EUI, which was still a young institution with limited means and prestige, was not necessarily beneficial for his career in his home country. His departure triggered a conflict regarding the future of the project. In October 1979, Lipgens expressed the desire to pursue the project in Saarbrücken and asked for a transfer of the European Commission’s subsidies devoted to the project.\footnote{Letter from Walter Lipgens to Christopher Auland, 31 October 1979 and Note de dossier, Historique du projet de recherche de l’Institut Universitaire Européen de Florence sur l’histoire de la coopération et de l’intégration européenne, DG X, 4 January 1980, both in HAEU, Folder EUI-10, 1974–1981.} The European Commission refused, arguing that the project was legally attached to the EUI and could not be carried out in another research institution.\footnote{European Commission, Legal Service, Note à l’attention de Monsieur Audland Secrétaire Général Adjoint, ‘Projet de recherche Histoire de l’intégration européenne de l’Institut universitaire européen’, 5 December 1979; Letter from Christopher Audland to Walter Lipgens, 31 December 1979; Note de dossier, Historique du projet de recherche de l’Institut Universitaire Européen de Florence sur l’histoire de la coopération et de l’intégration européenne, DG X, 4 January 1980, all in HAEU, Folder EUI-10, 1974–1981.} However, no professor at the HEC took on the project. Peter Ludlow had initially been involved in the project but he had remained skeptical towards its Europeanist stance.\footnote{European Commission, DG X, Note de dossier, Historique du projet de recherche de l’Institut Universitaire Européen de Florence sur l’histoire de la coopération et de l’intégration européenne, HAEU, Folder EUI-10, 1974–1981, 4 January 1980.} He ceased to collaborate with the project in 1980 and eventually left the EUI in 1983. As a result, the project stopped at the EUI and was partly continued in Saarbrücken, supported by private sponsors.\footnote{Lipgens and his former student Wilfried Loth carried on several parts of the project at the University of Sarrebrücken with a subsidy from the Volkswagen Foundation. See Wilfried Loth, Preface, in: Documents on the History of European Integration, vol. III, The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945–1950, Berlin/New York: W. de Gruyter, 1988, viii.} At the end of 1970s, the realisation of a Europeanist research agenda was hence jeopardised in both departments. The following developments confirmed this trend.

### 3. Struggles within the Departments: The Europeanist Research Agenda Eschewed or Challenged.

The late 1970s saw some of HEC and SPS scholars express reluctances to see their scientific activities be connected to a political agenda favourable to European integration. The early 1980s saw a deeper setting aside of this orientation.

Within SPS, while the question of the connection between the EUI and European integration was part of prior paradigm debates, it was soon eschewed in the framework of new disciplinary competitions. Peter Flora’s appointment indeed introduced sociology in a department that was before exclusively concerned with political science. While EUI political scientists and sociologists shared, as has been pointed out above, a common idea of what social science should be about, they
still had different disciplinary interests. The struggle between paradigms was thus gradually replaced by a struggle between disciplines.\footnote{Daalden, “Those first years at the Badia”, \textit{op. cit.}}

The two disciplinary branches became increasingly distinct from one another. The appointments of Wildenmann (1980), Ian Budge (1982), and Jean Blondel (1985), all former chairs or directors of the ECPR, signalled the institutionalisation at the department of an “uncompromising” blend of political science. Budge and Wildenmann especially were advocates of a very statistical approach to the study of politics, which focused on the variable-driven comparison of large numbers of countries, while paying little attention to their specific, more qualitative history—as Daalden was more inclined to do. The appointment, in 1982, of Philippe Schmitter, a scholar who defined himself both as a sociologist and a political scientist,\footnote{Schmitter was the author of concept of “neocorporatism” (Schmitter 1982) and had developed an interest in some of the key behaviouralist research topics (interest groups). He had an international trajectory (educated in France, the US, and Mexico, he had a degree from the University of Geneva and a PhD from Berkeley, and held a professorship at the University of Chicago) and was connected to the ECPR networks (interview with P. Schmitter).} did not significantly alter this dominant orientation. On the sociological side, Gosta Esping-Andersen’s appointment, in 1985, as Peter Flora’s successor, confirmed the institutionalisation of the comparison of welfare states at the EUI. As sociology became durably established, tensions between the two disciplines became increasingly vivid.

Different stumbling blocks underpinned these tensions. They were, first and foremost, about chairs: both disciplines sought their own growth and the wider possible representation of their subfields. Tense debates over “what should be the next chair: sociology of family or public policy?” often resulted in “a very ambiguous chair definition which everybody was happy with”, which would not really solve the problem as the “the fight” would then resume during the selection of candidates.\footnote{Interview with S. Bartolini.} As S. Bartolini’s account underlines, this “fight” became intense enough to threaten the very existence of the department:

It became a bit tense [between political science and sociology] as soon as the numbers generated group dynamics. When the department, by the end of the 1980s, began to be a department with seven or eight professors, the question of the next chair became a controversial issue. […] The department was torn apart by profound conflicts between sociologists and political scientists […] and every new chair was a fight between political scientists and sociologists. […] So much so that in 94, Blondel, when he passed on [the head of department] to me, said “we have to split the department”, divide it into two. […] From my training and my understanding I thought that was absolutely ludicrous and I worked very hard to overcome this.\footnote{Ibid.}

These quantitative staff concerns overlapped with political considerations. The opposition between political science and sociology appeared to be intertwined with rivalries between the “right” and “left” wings of the scientific field: sociology was described as leaning more towards the left than the blend of political science that was then developed at the EUI. As in the case of the literary field (Sapiro 2001), the use of these political classifications did not mean that properly scientific oppositions declined in importance or relevance. Rather, the use of the “left” and “right” categories stemmed directly from the intellectual structure of both disciplines at the time:
This department [...] was started by political scientists and by political scientists who did not have a lot of sympathy for sociology or sociologists. [...] I can’t say that was a political discrimination but there was a clear separation. [...] As a rule sociologists came out of leftist politics and most political scientists didn’t come from the right right but from the centre let’s say [...]. In many universities they had relatively little contact. This place supposedly brought them together but for the first few years there was really no sociology at all. And it started with Hans [Daalder], then with Rudolf [Wildenmann]. [...] Daalder had been trained in part in the United States and his approach was more historical than most Americans but still very much—political science was about parties and elections, period, and that’s the foundation. [Daalder’s successor] Wildenmann was even more that way, because with Wildenmann [...] it was not only American political science, it was Michigan political science, very much into survey research, very much focused on predicting elections, trying to understand party identification, hard core American political science. And I would say relatively—I wouldn’t say naïve but suspicious of theory and certainly theories, because if you talked about theory in those days, you had to deal with Marxism. And that was also one of the difference: most of sociology was one way or another, to differing degrees obviously, orthodoxy was rooted in the class structure, that was the core.53

Thus, contrary to prior paradigm debates, these diverging political views had little to do with European integration. They also indicated an intensification of scientific competitions between the two disciplines under study rather than a subordination of scientific activities to political agendas. They are, therefore, further proof that the initial Europeanist agenda of the EUI failed to become a structuring axis for the SPS department.

Within HEC, the position adopted towards European integration and the intervention of the European institutions played a much more determining role. While another economic historian, Peter Hertner, succeeded Charles Wilson, the Chair of Contemporary European history remained vacant after Lipgens’s departure in 1979. There are three explanations for this. First, in this period, the EUI was a young institution with limited means and staff in comparison with the main national universities. A temporary contract in Florence was therefore not necessarily attractive for professors wishing to anchor their career nationally. Second, the conflict between the Commission and Walter Lipgens, which brought to light the financial and institutional bounds between the EUI to the EC institutions, discouraged many historians jealous of their scientific independence from applying.54 Third, after Lipgens’s departure from the EUI and the end of the initial ‘History of European integration’ project, the European Commission’s efforts to promote history writing on European integration moved away from Florence. In 1982, the Commission organised a symposium of historians and launched a new international research platform: the Comité de liaison des historiens près la Commission européenne. Funded by and closely collaborating with the Commission, this Committee, which Lipgens actively contributed to set up, largely took up the objectives of the project initially designed at the EUI (Calligaro 2013).

It was only in 1983 that the Department appointed Alan S. Milward to the Chair of European Contemporary History. Previously chair of European Studies at the University of Manchester, Milward was an economic historian, partly influenced by the Marxist theory in the sense that he based his historical analysis on the understanding of the forces responsible for economic change.
Unlike most neoclassical historians and his predecessor Lipgens, he saw the State as one of the most powerful of these forces in contemporary Europe (Lynch and Guirao 2012). While at the EUI, Milward started to work on his controversial book *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* in which he considered European integration as an instrument that helped weakened nation-states face problems of national welfare. This thesis was in complete opposition to the official “*grand récit*” promoted by the European institutions, in which a united Europe was presented as the *telos*, as the driving force behind the integration process.

When Milward was appointed at the EUI, the EC was actively promoting this “*grand récit*” and designated European culture and history as vectors of political unification. The Milan European Council of June 1985 launched the campaign People’s Europe and approved the Adonnino and Dooge reports, which both called for symbolic and cultural initiatives. The president of the new Commission formed in 1985, Jacques Delors, put a European cultural policy high on his agenda. The action of the EUI’s president Werner Maihofer, who took up office in 1982, was in keeping with this agenda. A German jurist and politician, former Federal Minister of the Interior and member of the pro-European liberal party FDP (Free Democratic Party), Maihofer supported initiatives that put an accent on European culture and history, while strengthening the link with the EC. In 1984, he signed an agreement with the European Commission which established the Historical Archives of the Communities at the EUI. The same year, Maihofer proposed to create an interdepartmental chair entitled “History of European culture”, eventually attributed in 1985 to Daniel Roche, a French specialist of cultural history. In 1986, the EUI opened a Research Centre on European Culture. In the second half of the 1980s, the Institute also hosted meetings of Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s project *Europe: a History of its People*, launched in 1985 and supported by the European Commission.

These actions faced resistances from the HEC department. Members of the department criticised the chair on the “History of European culture”, which they saw as a product of the EC’s desires. In reaction to later developments, Alan Milward openly denounced the fact that the EUI’s scientific orientation was strongly influenced by the EC’s political agenda, and remained reluctant to cooperate with the EC institutions on scientific projects. Rather, he developed his “revisionist” thought, clearly breaking with Lipgens’s theses and minimising the role of federalist ideas of the Resistance in the emergence of the post-war European institutions. He actively fought against teleological approaches to European integration and contributed to deconstructing founding myths like the one of the founding fathers. As a consequence, he established his reputation as an “Anti-Lipgens” or...

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58 This agreement is accessible here: http://www.eui.eu/Documents/Research/HistoricalArchivesofEU/Contract.pdf
60 Letter from Alan Milward to Michel Dumoulin, 4 May 1984, Michel Dumoulin’s private archives, Folder ‘Groupe de Liaison des Historiens’.
61 Interview with an administrator of the EUI academic service.
63 Alan Milward, *The lives and teachings of the European saints*, in: *The European rescue..., op.cit.*, 318–344. On the criticism of functionalism and federalism as teleological and ideological theories, see Alan S. Milward, Frances Lynch,
“demythifier” of European integration.64 To this extent, Milward’s stay at the EUI contributed to a detachment and normalisation of the historiography of European integration vis-à-vis European institutions.

By the mid-1980s, a Europeanist research agenda was no longer represented in the SPS department. In HEC, contemporary European history, originally conceived as a key discipline for the promotion of the unification project, was no longer dominated by this normative approach.

Conclusion

This article sought to analyse the conditions under which political attempts at influencing the activities of scientists succeed or fail. It did so by assessing the impact of European politics on the development of the social and human sciences. More specifically, it focused on the creation of the European University Institute and studied the extent to which European institutions influenced EUI scholars’ scientific agenda, in a direction favourable to European integration.

While the creation of the EUI had clear political motives, this political agenda did not feed directly into EUI scientific activities. Rather, the positioning of their research towards the European political project was, from the outset, a contentious issue for the professors recruited in the early years of the EUI. In the SPS department, the debate on the role of social and political sciences in the context of European unification was embedded in broader paradigmatic and disciplinary struggles. These struggles eventually eclipsed the question of the scholars’ political stance towards the European project and partially account for the weakness of the European integration agenda within the SPS department by the mid-1980s. EC institutions sought to be more directly involved in the research agenda of the HEC department, notably by funding a research project on the “History of European Integration”. Several developments account for the failure of the original objective of turning the HEC department into a pivotal platform for European integration history: first, the tensions resulting from the institutional interference in scientific research, which some embraced in an open attempt to give more solid grounds to European unification, and others resisted in the name of scientific autonomy; second, the intellectual disagreements over the interpretation of European integration, which some scholars described as driven by non-governmental federalist movements, while others saw the effort of governmental actors to restore the nation state’s power as its main driving force.

The case of the EUI shows that political attempts at influencing the development of sciences tend to face resistances and have unintended consequences. As scientific fields develop, they become increasingly structured by specific norms (such as the idea that scientific activity should be value-free and politically neutral), rules (e.g. processes for hiring new colleagues), and controversies (debates between paradigms, approaches, methods, ideas). The institutionalisation of these specificities strengthens the autonomy of scientific fields, to the point that external and notably political injunctions have trouble gaining currency, and are refracted and bent according to the structures of fields. By claiming to be acting in the name of science, scholars may be able to eschew or even criticise such injunctions. Paradoxically then, an institute initially created with the objective of promoting European integration can instead provide room for the development of a critical


discourse on the process, as in the case of Alan Milward, who made this revealing acknowledgment in one of his books:

I am profoundly grateful to the European Community and to the President of the European University Institute, Herr Werner Maihofer, for supporting so enthusiastically research which must have appeared at first to be coming to wholly unwanted conclusions. To how many national governments could a similar tribute be paid?65

This autonomy of scientific fields, however, is only relative, and different regions of science are not equally autonomous. For reasons linked to their own trajectory and the structure of their particular discipline or research area, scholars are not equally receptive to political injunctions. As has been shown by the comparison of the HEC and SPS departments, some disciplines may be the subject of stronger political investments than others. Two hypotheses may be put forward to explain the special attention paid to history by European institutions.

The first is related to the specific identity-building and legitimising capacities attributed to history, since historiography was seen as able to participate in the elaboration of a narrative that Europeans could identify with. Jean Monnet, his close collaborators and EC officials in charge of information were strongly concerned with the historicisation of the political project that they were defending. They had, very early on, envisaged the history of Europe or of its founding fathers as an instrument for the promotion of political unification (Cohen 2007, Calligaro 2013). A second related explanation is the lack of interest of the discipline for European unification that these EC officials could observe in the mid-1970s.66 In this period, European regional integration had become an object of research in several SSH disciplines like law, economics and political science. In comparison, the study of European unification and of the emergence of the EC was marginal in academic historiography. Stimulating this research through financial support and through the creation of international projects therefore appeared as a relevant political objective. The idea of developing a history of European integration platform at the EUI was, thus, part of a broader effort in the historiographical field.

The politicisation of scientific disciplines appears to be determined by complex social negotiations that depend on the structure of disciplinary fields (itself linked to their relative professionalisation and autonomisation), the needs of political institutions (e.g. the need for legitimising narratives), and the social representations of disciplines and their powers (such as the perception of history as a discipline able to produce such narratives). These multiple parameters have different consequences for the development of disciplines, even in the framework of a single institution. In the two cases under study, however, the attempt to legitimise European integration with social scientific and historical knowledge fell short of ambitions. This negative case provides a counterweight to narratives that insist on the role of sciences in the strengthening of their political patrons.

66 Interview with J. Lastenouse.
References


